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INTRODUCTION
The author was chagrined to
discover that his most recent article
on "MontanaLaw and the Out-oÊ
State Policy" (Trial Trends, Âutumn
1998) is now rwelve years old when
the guiding cases u/ere otiy Kemþ u.
Allstate (1979)'z and Yoøngblood u.
American States Ins. Co. (1993).3 The
Montana Supreme Court has since
issued at least seven opinions involv-
ing conflicts'of law and out-of-state
auto policies, and the decisions signal
change important to claimants' coun-
sel. As late as 2007 in lVarnsley u.
Nodak Mataal Ins. Co.,a Justice Warner
complained in his dissent that the
court was virtually following a de
that, if an accident happened in Mon-
tana, the out-of-state insurance policy
had to be interpreted according to
Montana law. After the same court's
subsequent decisions in Moodro u.
Nationwide Matual Fire Ins. Co. (2008),s
Tinas u. Progresiue Preferred Ins. Co.
(2008)6 and Tacker u. Farmers Insurance
Exch a nge (2009),7 Jus rice \ùTarner
would make no such charge. A sea
change is underway in how the court
determines which law applies to out-
of-state policies, and that change
will make for tougher sailing for
claimants.
\ùØhcther Montana law appJies to
an out-of-state policy involved in an
accident in Montana is critical, be-
cause Montana has well-developed
common law for protection of auto
insurance consumers thát other states
generally lack. Consider, for example,
just these few Montana rules and
their case precedents:
An insurer is not entitled to
subrogation until the insured is
made whole including costs and
àttorney fees. Skaage u. Moantain
Srat¿sTe/. dzTe/. Co. (1977);8
DieTienne Assoc. u. Farmers tJnion Mat
Ins. (1,994)l Swanson u. Hartford Ins.
Co of the M¿dwest Q002).10
. An insurer mây not place a
provision in an insurance policy
that defeats coverage for which the
insurer has received valuable
consideration. Røckdascbel u. State
Farm Mutual Aøto. Ins. Co. (1,997)11
Bennett u. State Farn Mataal Aato
[ns. Co. (1993).12
. Montana's anti-stacking st¿tute is
unconsdrudonal for violation of
substantive due. process. Harþ u.
Progrusiue (2003).t3
. The tortfeasor's liability insurer
must advance medical expenses in
cases where liability is reasonably
clear Ndle1 u. Cøaranfl Natiorual lrus.
Co. (1997).M
. The tortfeasor's liability insuret
must advânce lost wages in cases
where liability is reasonably clear.
Døbrq a. Farrners Irus. Fxchange
(2001).,s
. The insurcr may not offset against
Uninsured Motorist coverage
benefìts paid under the Bodily
Injury coverage. Swar¿son u. Haøþrd
Ins. Co. of tbe Midwest (2002),16
Mitchell u. State Farru Insørance
Cornþary Q003),17 Harþ u. Progres
siue Q003).18
. The auto insurer may not demand
a release in reasonably clear
liabiliry cases involving minimum
lirnits of insurance. lYalters u.
Gaaranfl National Ins. Co. (2000).1e
' The "{ami7y exclusion" clause in
Bodily Injury coverage is invalid as
against pub,lic poJicy. Transanerica
Ins. Co. u. Roltle (1983).'z0
. The auto insurer ma)¿ not subio-
gate to recover benefits paid under
Medical Pay coverage. Allstate Ins.
Co. u. Reitler (1981).'zl
In Trial Trends articles entided
"Invaliclating r{uto Policy Provisions
in Montana" $X/inter 1.999) anð.
'Voiding Äuto Insurance clauses for
Violaung Public Policy" (Autumn
2004), the author identifi.ed over
twenty standard auto policy exclu-
sions, conditions, or offsets that have
been declared invalid by the Montana
courts. Arguably, Mohtana Law pro-
vides some of the'strongest public
policy protections for auto insurânce
consumers in the'nation. In nearþ
all cases, it is in the injured claimant's
interest to apply Montana law to the
out-of-state auto policy providing
coverage for a Montana auto accident.
Kemp a. Allstate Q979)z Applr,rng
the Statutory "Place of Perfor- "
mancett Test Absent,a Choice.of-
Law Provision
In the 1998 article on the out-of-
state policy, I noted that the courts
around the nation,had previously
established a general rule, that auto
insurance policies were governed by
the law of the place in which the
contfact was made,22 However, the
Montana Supreme Court had pur-
ported to reject ¡þs ÍÍrn6ds¡n ¿p-:
proach"z3 which appJigd to'auto
insurance contracts the'law of .the
state having the "most significant
relationship" to the i$sue to be de-
cided. \Øhïe rejecting what it de-
scribed as the "revisionisC'?a modern
approach, the Montana Supreme
Court used a "place of performance"
test that resulted in appþing Montana
law to out-of-state policies involved
in accidents in Montana.
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This could be {ìrst seen in the
seminal and nationally noted case of
Kenp u. Allstate in 1979. Julie l(emp, a
resident of New York, was a passen-
ger in an auto garaged in Vermont
when she was struck and killed in
Butte, Montanalry an auto driven by
aMontana resident. The car in which
I(emp rode was insured with Allstate
in Vermont and driven by her grand-
father, a Vermont resident. In all,
I(emp was an "insured" for Unin-
sured Motorist coverage under a
Vermont policy covering two autos
of her grandparents with whom she
rode and an Allstate policy covering
three autos of her parents in New
York. Both policies involving sepa-
rate premiums for each auto they
covered. Montana allowed stacking
of the Uninsured Motorist coverage
of such poJicies while:Vermont and
New York law prohibited stacking.
Neither of the poJicies contained a
choice-of-law piovision.
The Montana Supreme Court
declined to adopt what the justices
termed the "revisionist" approach of
the Restatement of Conflicts $ 6
which would require the court to
analyze the contract to see which
state had "the.most significant rela-
tionship with the parties, the transac-
tion or the occurrence with regarå
to the issues in dispute." The court
elected instead to follov¡ the Montana
statute governing choice-of-law for
contracts concluding that "place
of performance" and not place
of execution governed:
MCA 528-3-102 - Vhat
law and usage to govern
interpretation
A contrâct is to be interpreted
according to the law and usage
of the place where it is to be
performed; or, if it does not
indicate aplace of perfor-
mance, according to the law
and usage of the place where
it is made.
The court noted three parts of
the Allstate policies that indicated
place of performance:
First, the basic insuring agree-
ment promised "to pay all sums
which the insured or his legal repre-
sentative shall be legally entided to
recover as damages from the owner
or operator of an uninsured automo-
bile because of bodily injury. . . in-
cluding death . . . sustained by the
insuted, caused by accident arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or
use, of such uninsured automobile."
Second, the territorial coverage agree-
ment provided coverage within the
United States which agreement the
court found to contemplâte payment
in any state where the insured was
liable. Third, the stanclard "payment
of loss" ptovision would result in
payment of the Silver Bow Counry
judgment being made to the
deceased's representative in that court
in Montana, the judgment having
been made final.
Consequently, the. court con-
cluded that the place of performance
was Montana so that the policy would
be construed uncler Montana law to
allow stacking of the UM coverages.
As a conflicts-of-law holding, this
was gratifying to claimants' counsel
in Montana because the standard
policy provisions and the factors the
court noted v¡ould likely be present in
almost any accident case involving an
out-of-state auto. Hence, absent a
choice-of-law provision, one could
predict that Montana law would apply
in such cases.
Youngblood ø. American Stdtes
(1993): Rejecting an Oregon
Choice-of-Law Provision as
Against Montana Public Policy
The case of Yoøngblood u. American
State¡ Ins. Co. in 1.993 involved an
Oregon auto poJicy that contained a
choice-of-law provision that the
Montana Supreme Court found "ex-
presses the intention of the parties to
apply Oregon law no m^tter where
the acciclent occurred or where the
contract is to be performed."" The
court coflceded that an unambiguous
choice-of-law provision had to be
enforced unless it was against
Montana pubtic policy.
However, at issue in Youngblood
was the subrogatìon clause in the
Medical Pay coverage of the Oregon
poJicy under which 
'\merican States
wanted to recovef amounts paid from
any money the tortfeasor paid its
injurecl insured. Oregon allowed such
subrogation, but Montana law for-
bade it as against public policy under
Allstate Ins. Co. u. Reitler (1.981).26
Plaintiff father and daughter were
residents of Oregon and lØashington
respectively. The auto was apparendy
garaged in Oregon and the policy
issued in Oregon. The accident hap-
pened in Montana. The question,
then, was whether Montana or
Oregon law would control the issue.
The Yoangb/ood court noted that,
in general, "[Ilh" law of the place of
petformance controls legal construc-
tion and effect, while the law of the
place where the contract is made
governs on questions of execution
and validity."27 As in l(emp, the court
found dispositive the fact that the
general policy language required
American States to pay whatever
damages were required in Montana,
so that the contract was deemed to
be performed in Montana.
However, the coutt conceded
that the policy's choice-of-law provi-
sion, if not ambiguous, would have
to be enforced unless it violated
public policy. The court then found
that the medical pay subrogation
provision violated Montana public
policy, which prohibited such subro-
gation, and refused to enforce it.28
Hence, the court established that a
choice-of-law provision in the insur-
ance policy could determine place of
performance and require application
of another state's law to govern
policy interpretation. However, if
application of that state's law would
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give effect to a provision void as
against public policy under Montana
laq a Montana col)rt could tefuse to
enforce it.
Hence, I(emþ meant that, absent a
choice-oÊlaw provision, the policy
would be governed by "place of
performance," which, under the stan-
dard basic insuring agreement and
standard provisions for territorial
coverage and payment of loss, would
Jikely be the place where the accident
happened. Yoøngblood meant that a
choice-of-law provision would gov-
ern which state's law applied but
could not force a Montana court to
enforce a provision void as against
Montana's public policy.
Swanson a. Hartford (2002):
Following Youngblood and Re-
jecting a Colotado Choice-of-Law
Provision as Against Montana
Public Policy
In Swanson u. Harford lrus. of the
Midwest Q002),2e the Montana Su-
preme Court âccepted certification
from the federal court of issues in-
volved when a Colorado insutance
policy applied to an accident in Mon-
tana. The Swansons, who resided
both in Montana and in Colorado
during any given year, \¡/ere severely
injured in a collision with a USF/
Reddaway tràctor-tra:tfer at Ravalli,
Montana. They incurred over $50,000
in medical experrses in Montana,
which they submitted under their
policy issued in Colorado. The Colo-
rado "no-fault" policy contained PIP,
"personal injury, protection" that
covered medical expenses with a
subrogation clause giving the carrier
the right to recover any payments
made undet PIP from any third party
regardless of whether the insured has
been "made whole." Importantly, the
policy also contained a "choice of
lau/' provision stating disputes would
be governed by Colorado law.
Hartford asserted its subrogation
with Continental, the insurer for
USF/Reddaway, causing Continental
to put Hartford's name on a $26,000
check for advance medicals. Hartford
held the check and refused to endorse
it for fifteen months until Swansons
sued for bacl faith. The case was
removed to fedetal court, v/hich certi-
fìed to the Montana Supreme Court
questions of: (1) whether medical pay
subrogation is against public policy in
Montana; (2) whether the "made-
whole" doctrine is public policy in
Montana regatdless of policy lan-
guage to the contrary; and (3)
whether a Colotado "choice of lav/'
provision violates Montana Public
Policy if Colorado law allows subro-
gation regardless of whether the
insured has been made whole.
The Montana Supreme Court
held that "[i]t is public policy in
Moritana that an insured must be
totally reimbursed for all losses as
well as costs, including attorncy fccs,
involved in tec'overing those losses
before the insurer can cxcrcisc any
right of subrogation regatdless of
contract language to the contrary."
It then followecl Yoangblood in
fìrst recognizing that it must apply
Colorado law in the face of the
choice-ofJaw' provision ar,rd then
refusing to enforce,the subrogation 
,
ptovision.teasoning that it was void
as against public policy in Montana '
for allowing reimbursement of the
insurer before the insured has been
macle whole. Notably the court said,
"Therefore we conclude that applica-
tion of the Colorado choice-of-law
provision violates Montana pubJic
policy, and that Montana's 'made
whole'doctrine shall be applied to
the subrogation ptovision." One
might ask whether it is application
of the choice-of-law provision or the
application of the subrogation clause
that violates pubJic poJicy. Can we
assume that the choice-of-law provi-
sion would still apply to any clause
that did not violate Montana public
polìcy?
Cøsarotto e. Lombardi (1994)z
Adopting Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws $$ 187-188 and
Making it Consistent with
Youngblood
In 1.994, the Montana Supreme
Court applied Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws $ 187 and 188
and Yoangblood to resolve the issue
of which state's law applied in a
franchise contract case. Casarotto u.
Inznbardfo involved 
^ 
festatrrant fran-
chise dispute and the issue of legality
oF a mandatory arbitration provision
in the franchise contract. The agree-
ment expressly provided that it "shall
be governed by and construecl in
accordance v¡ith the laws of the State
rWn,rcoun Nnw Axo RBrunNrNG MEMBERS
MqN:EäU{A!T.EIbUIåéWJEBS
JTISTICE ALL
James David Johnson
Michael I(auffman
Paul Neal
Paul Simon
Nathan \)Tagner
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of Connecticut. ." In its decision,
the court quoted Restatement (Sec-
ond) Conflicts of Laws S 188 (1971)
in part, but it is well to quote it in
full here:
$ 188. Law Governing in Ab-
sence of Effective Choice of
Law by the Parties
(1) The rights and duties of
the parties with respect to an
issue in contract are deter-
mined by the local law of the
state which, with tespect to
that issue, has the most signi{ì-
cant relationship to the trans-
action and the parties under
the princþles stated i" S 6.
(2) In the absence of an effec-
tive choice of law by the par-
ties (see S 187), the context to
be taken into account in apply-
ing then princþles of $ 6 to
determine the law applicable to
an issue include:
(a) the place of contracling,
þ) th. place of negotiation of
the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject
m tter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence,
nattonahry, place of incorpo-
ration and place of business
of the parties.
These contracts are to be
evaluated according to their
relative impottance with re-
spect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating
the contract and the place of
performance are in the same
state, the local law of this state
will usually be appliecl, except
as otherwise provided in $$
1.89-1.99 and 203.
The court noted the language
"in the absence of an effective choice
of law" and used Youngblood to sup-
port the proposition that a choice of
law cannot be "effective" if it is
against public policy. The court
found Yoangblood consistent with
S 187(2) of the Restatement which
it quoted in part:
(2) the law of the state chosen
by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties
will be applied, even if the
patticular issue is one which
the parties coulcl not have re-
solved by an explicit provision
in therr âgreement directed to
that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no sub-
stantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable
basis for the parties' choice,
of
þ) appJication of the law
of the chosen state would
be contrary to a funda-
mental policy of the state
which has a materially
greate( interest than the
chosen state in the deter-
mination of the particular
issue and which, under the
rule of $ 1BB, would be
the state of the applicable
law in the absence of an
effective choice of law by
the parties.
The court then determined that
Montanahad a 1'mateil-¿,þ greater
interest" than Connecticut because
franchise negotiations, franchise loca-
tion, operatiorl, contract performance,
ancl residence of fianchise owners
were all in Gteat Falls, Montana.
Finally, the court concluded that the
arbitrauon clause and lack of notice
of that clause were contnary to a
fundamental public policy of the
State of Montana. Hence, Montana
law applied so that the arbitration
clause would not be enforcecl.
It seems fair to conclucle from
the court's reasoning that, having
concluded that there v/âs no "effec-
tive choice of law," the court used
the "most signifìcant relationship to
the transaction" test of $ 188 (2) by
applylng the {ìve factors of subsec-
tion (3). Howevet, equaþ important
What would your pract¡ce be like without MTLA?
You could be hiring experts to help you apportion the damages
attributable to your client not wearing her seat belt when her car was hit from the rear
while she was stopped at a red light. You could be calling all your colleagues, one by one,
day after day, trying to find out if anybody had any experience with, depositions of,
or ¡nformation on the defense medical expert that is about to examine your client.
Increasing your membership level helps assure that MTLA continues its legislative work,
provides listserve access to the collective expertise of all MTLA members, and so much more
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is the fact that the court appeared to
find that appJicatron of the Connecti-
cut choice-ofJaw provision "would
be conttary to a fundamental policy''
of Montana v¡hich the court ex-
pressly found had a "materia)Iy
greâter interest" than Connecticut.
Hence, Ca¡arotlo seems to consider
the fìve factors for "most sþificant
relationship to the transaction" and,
separate and apart, "materially greater
interest" based in Montana's pubJic
policy involving invalidity of some
arbiration provisions.
Mitcbell o. Stdte Farm (2003):
Applylng the Restatement to
aff:rlm Kemp, Yoangblood, and
the Statutory Directive for Place
of Performance
Mitchell u. State Farrz Aøto. Ins. Co.
Q003)31 involved ø Cahfornia auto
poìicy with no choice-of-law provi-
sion. Mitchell, a Cahforian atrending
school in Montana, was injured in an
auto accident in Montana while a
passenger in a vehicle owned by
Haas. He settled with Haas's carfier,
Fatmers Insurance Company, for the
$50,000 BI coverage limits and then
sought to stack UIM benefìts under
thc coverage for the five vehicles his
parents insured with State Farm in
California.
The State Farm policy contained
three provisions at issue, which pro-
visions Montana had declared void as
against public policy. The provisions
were: (1) an unduly restrictive defini-
tion of an underinsured motor ve-
hicle; (2) an offset of BI benefits
received against UIM benefits due;
and, (3) a UM/UIM anti-stacking
provision. All three provisions were
valid in California and void as against
public interest in Montana, so that
recovery hinged on which state's law
applied. The lower coutt applied the
Restatement to find California law
applied.
Having resolved Casarolto on the
basis of the Restatement and 
,
Yoøngblood, the die appeared cast
when Mitchell presented in the Mon-
tana Supreme Court. Indeed, the
court began by acknowledging that
consistency with Casarotto required
the clistrict court to apply the Restate-
ment (Second) Conflicts of Laws.
However, the court said the district
court's application that resulted in the
conclusion that California law app-lied
was erroneous, and the Suprer.ne
Court returned to the law of
Youngblood to resolve the conflict
oF lav¡. The court focused on the
reference in $ 188(1) above to $ 6
which provides:
$ 6. Choice-of-Law Principles(1) A court, subject to consti-
tutional restrictions, will follow
â stafutory directive of its own
state on choice of law:
(2) \X/here there is no such
directive, the factors relevant
to the choice of law include. . .
Citing S 6(1), the court faulted
the clistrict court for not following
Montana's stâtutory ditective which
provides:
MCA S 28-3-102. What La.w.
and usage to govern interpre-
tation.
A contract is to be interpreted
according to the law in usage
where it is to be petformed, or,
if it does not indicate a place
of perfotmance, according to
the law and usage of the place
where it is made.
The court then followed the I(enrp
analysis concluding that the standard
provisions such as territoriaìity indi-:
cate place of performance to be
where the claim arises and the judg-
ment would be paid, that being Mon-
tana. The court explâined that Kernp
was still good law after adoption of
the Restatement, because $ 6(1) of
the Restatcment "requires a court to
first look to relevant stâte lâw when
determining applicable lav¡." Âccord-
ingly, the court helcl that Montana law
applied as the law of the place where
the contraÇt was,to be performed.
Applying Montana law, the court
found the UIM defìnition, UIM off-
set ptov-ision, and UIM anti-stacking
provisions all void as against public
policy.
Mitcl¡ell reinforced l{enp in the
principle that, absent a choice-of-law
provision, the Montana statute, MCA
S 28-3-102 controls the law to be
applied by specifying that "place
of performance" is determinative.
Moreover, the standatd auto insut-
ance provisions on territoriality,
grant of coverâge, and payment of
claims indicate the place of perfor-
mànce will be the state where the
auto accident claims arise.
Oberson a. Federated Mwtual Ins.
Co. (2005): Denying Application
of Michigan Law to a Michigan
Workers' Compensation Policy in
Montana32
Obersqn v/as the conseÍvâtor for
Musselman who was a Michigan
resident working for a Michigan En-
gineering firm in Montana when he
was catastrophicaLly injured. Feder-
ated, the work comp insurer, wanted
to subrogate against alarge but inad-
equate verdict Musselman won in a
Montana court. Federated filed a
subrogation action in the \X/orkers'
Compensation colut for Michigan,
and Mussêlrnan fìled a declaratory
action in Montana. Michigan allowed
such subrogation, and Montana pro-
hibited it as against public policy. The
issue was whether Michigan law
would apply or that of Montana.
The Montana court refused to
grant comity to the decision of the
Michigan work comp court on the
ground that comity is cntirely volun-
tary and need not be granted when
Montana has a strong.public policy
interest in not allowing the subroga-
tion. The court refused to adopt
$ 185 of the Restatement which
governed subrogation in work places
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saylng that it adopted Restatement
sections only aftet evaluating Montana
public policies and the Legislature's
statutory guidance. The court said,.
"Moreover, in choice of law cases,
this court has consistently rejected
tigid tules, favoring the modern trend
toward a more flexible approach
which permits analysis of the policies
and interests undedying the particular
issue before the court."
The court refused to apply
Michigan law citing Article II, Sec-
tion 16 of the Montana Constitution
for its guarantee of a right of full
legal redress for injuqr in ernploy-
ment. The court then cited Yoøngblood
(1,993) and Swanson (2002) as ex-
amples of cases in which court
applied Montana law to prohibit
subrogation by out-of-state insurers.
lüJ}ile Oberson ts aworkers' compen-
sation case, it is notable because it
refused the inflexible approach of
applylng Restatement $ 185, favonng
instead an approach that would allow
consicleration of Montana public
policy. \X/e will see later that, in the
atea of auto insurance, adherence
to the Restatement would indeed
result in a rote approach that would
completeþ ignore Montana's strong
pubJic policy protecting auto insurcds.
Kilmer a. State Farm (2005)rAp-
plyrng Mitchell to the Montana
Policy in Another State
Mitcbe ll I reaff.maíon of
Yoøngblood and Kemþ was salutary fot
claimants' lawyers. However, under
those cases, if a Montana policy is
involved in an accident in another
stâte, one might say that every silver
Jining has a dark clottd. Kilzner u. State
Farø Møtaal Aøto. Ins. (2005)33 was
litigated in the United States District
Court in Billings. Plaintifl I(ilmer, a
North Dakota resident, was rendered
quadriplegic in àn 
^úto accident nearBeach, North Dakota while insured
under a State Farm policy issued in
Montana. He sought the court's
ruling that Montana was the place
of performance of the rnsurance
contrâct so thât he would be entitled
to Undetinsured Motorist coverage
benefits. I(lmer wanted the protec-
tion of Montana's defìnition of an
"Underinsured Motor Vehicle" and
the freedom that Montana law would
provide from the policy's anti-stack-
ing provision
I(ilmer lived on a ranch near
Beach, North Dakota, which
straddles the Montana/North Dakota
border. I(lmer introduced much
evidence that he conducted his affairs
in Montana including the facts that
he was getting medical treatment at
Sidney, had aMontana driver's li-
cense, did seasonal work in Montana,
and was conducting some of his
litigation in Montana. Accordingly,
he argued that Montana law should
âPply.
Unfortunateþ for I(ilmer, the
federal court'wâs bound to follow the
Montana precedents of Mitchell and
its reliance on l{enuþ in holding that
"place of petformance" dictates the
law that applies to the auto insurance
contract. The court followed an
analysis virtuaþ identical to that of
Mìtîhell and found dispositive the
facts that the accident happened in
North Dakota and involved people
who neither lived nor worked in
Montana ñ rhú time. The court con-
cluded that the place of petformance
was North Dakota in spite of the fact
that the plaintìff had much personal
business corìtact, medical treatment,
and some litigation in Montana.
.Wamsley t:. Nodak (2008):
Denying Full Faith and Credit to
Notth Dakota in a Race to the
Courthouse
The cases discussed so far have
all involved Montana courts cleciding
if Montana law applied. The situation
is more compJicated where â court
in another state is intent on making
the same decision at the same time.
lVamsle-1t u. Nodak Mat. Ins. Co.
(2008)34 reflects the response of
some insurers to the Mitchell/Kenp
analysis which seemed to inevitably
conclude that Montana law would
apply to out-of-state policies, Insurers
began fìling actions in the courts of
the states that issued the out-of-state
policies seeking declarations that the
law of the issuing state as opposed to
Montana appliecl. The actions were
often fìled immediately after Montana
counsel advised the insurer of inten-
tion to interpret policy provisions
under Montana Iaw.
The Wamsleys, residents of
North Dakota, wete driving their
Chrysler mini-van near Bozeman,
Montana. Stanton, a Montanan, who
was intoxicated and passed out at the
wheel, crossed the center divide,
hitting the ìØamsleys. The two cars
proceeded to hit a motor home trav-
eling behind them. The !7amsleys
ancl Stanton died from the accident.
The \X/amsleys had three cars insured
v¡ith Nodak in North Dakota, each
ptoviding $100,000 per insured in
UIM coverage. The two other cars
were garaged in North Dakota, The
company paìd a singlc limit of
$100,000 UIM for each death but
refused to pay the $400,000 UIM
limits available if the two other
policies were stacked.
North Dakota law does not allow
stacking. Montana counsel demanded
that the pohcies be stacked under
Montana law, and the insurer re-
quested and ieceivçd additional time
to study the request but actually usecl
the time to prepare and file a declarz-
tory action in North Dakota before
the plaintiffs could file in Montana.
Plaintiffs then immediateþ filecl in
Montana. The Montana District
Court refused Nodak's request for a
stay of the Montana pioceedings.
Subsequently, the court refused
Nodak's request to validate the sum-
mary judgment it received in North
Dakota under the Full Faith and
Credit clause of the constitution.
Nodak'also'argucd Mootana did not
have personal jurisdiction over it. The
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Montana court ruled Nodak had waived the personal
jurisdiction defense by failing to perfect it proceduraþ
On appellate review, the Montana Supreme Court
recited a careful step-by-step approach in which Restate-
ment $ 6(1) is considered first, requiring the court to look
at the relevant state law 
- 
in this case MCA S 28-3-102.
As noted eaÃ:rcr, that statute provides a contràct is to be
interpreted according to where it is to be performed or, if
it does not indicate a place of performance, according to
the law and usage of the place where it is made. The
Nodak policies contained standard provisions nearþ iden-
tical to those in MitcbelÌ including the territoriality provi-
sion. The accident occurred ìn Montana; damages were
suffered in Montana; suit was filed against a Montana
tortfeasor in Montana; the insurer had already paicl
$200,000 in UIM claims in Montana. Hence, the court
followed Mitchell Q003), in ruling that the place of perfor-
maflce, pursuaflt to MCA S 28-3-102, was where an jn-
sured is entitled to receive benefìts, has incurred accident
related expenses, or is entitled to judgment. Hence, the
IVanslel decision was entirely consistent with Mitchell/Kerrp.
However, the Montana Supreme Court had to deal
with the earþ conflicting judgment won in North Dakota
in the race to the courthouse. The North Dakota Supreme
Court in the interim had upheld that judgment holding
that North Dakota law appliecl and did not allow stack-
ing.3s Nevertheless, the Montana Supreme Court held that
the Montana District Court did not err in refusing to give
full faith and credit to the North Dakota Supreme Court
decision reasoning that a court need not accord full faith
and credit if the action of the foreign court would "im-
permissibly interfere with Montana litigation." The court
noted the "back door" tactic used by the insurer of re-
questing time to study the mâtter whle racing to the
North Dakota courts to avoid having the matter Jitigated
in Montana and concluded it was ân attempt to impose
"interlocutory control" over State District Courts in
Montana. The court determined that the North Dakota
clecision could be treated as an "advisoty opinion." Note
however, that the Montana court refused the argument
that Full Faith and Creclit should not be honored where
the Noth Dakota judgment would violate public policy
of the State of Montana saying that is not ân adequate
ground for refusal. The coutt said, "[A]s a general rule,
a judgment must be afforded full faith and credit regard-
less of how greatly it offends the public polìcy of
Mofltafla."36
Notable also was the sharp dissent of Justices Gray,
ìØatner, and Judge $íayne Phllips from the majority's
refusal to accord full faith and credit and from the {ìnding
that Montana prevails under conflicts-of-law pnnciples.
They contended that MCA S 28-3-102, read the way the
court was reading it, ultimateþ meànt that, whenever an
acciclent happened in Montana, Montana law would be
applied. In hindsight, the dissent sþaled a gathering
stofm.
Modroo ú. Ndtionu)ide (2005)z Eroding Montana's
"Materially Greater Interest" in Policies Covering
Auto Accidents in This State
In Mo'droo u. Nationwide Mataal Fire Ins. Co. Q00B),37
Justice Leaphart, writing for the majority, focused his
Restatement analysis in that conflicts-of-law case to con-
sideration of v¡hich state has the "materially greater inter-
est" in the subject matter and issues. In Moodro, University
of Montana student, Mamie l{ardy, a resident of Ohio,
died a couple days after being injured âs â passenger in a
single-vehicle accident in Mineral County, Montana. On
behalf of the driver, Allstate paid $50,000 limits of BI
coverage without a release, and Mamie's mother, Mary
Modtoo, as personal representative of her estate, sued
the tortfeasor and three Nationwide insurers that provided
the family UIM coverage under farm business and per-
sonal auto policies in Ohio. Nationwide's personal auto
policy (ultimately at issue in the case) insured two vehicles
for UIM coverage of $300,000 per person. The UIM
coverage, which contained an offset for any amounts paid
:
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by Jiable parties and an anti-stacking
provision, contained a choice-of-lav¡
provision that Ohio law would gov-
ern interpretation.
Modroo sought to stack the [mits
of the Ohio personal auto policy
UTM as a result of Mamie's injury
ancl death. The issue was whcthcr the
court should apply Ohio läw that
would enforce provisions barring
stacking and allowing offsets against
the UIM coverage, which provisions
would each violate Montana public
policy. On its facts, Moodro was the
Yoangblood case, and Yoøngblood was
still good law, so one could have
predicted that the court would hold
that Montana law applied. Both cases
had choice-of-law ptovisions, which,
if applied, would result in violation
of Montana public policy. For that
reason, the court could fìnd that the
policy contained no "effective"
choice-of-law provision and fìnd that
Montana had a "mateitally greater
interest" that v/ould allow its public
policy to ovcrridc the offending
insurance provisions.
On appeal, howevet, the court
held that, by the terms of the policy,
the law oF Montana, where the acci-
clent occurred, governed the compen-
satory damages available in tott under
the UIM coverage, whjle the law of
Ohio governed the interpretatìon of
the policy contract. The court rea-
soned that the petsonal auto policy
UIM coverage said it would pay com-
pensatory damages that you ". . àte
legally entitled to recover from the
owner or dfiver" of an underinsured
motor vehicle "under the tort law of
the state where the motor vehicle
accident occurred." The policy also
provided that the "contract law
of the State of Ohio governs the
interpretation of this contract." The
Montana Supreme Court said these
differing provisions âre not in
conflict and produce no ambþity.
The coutt then held that the
stacking and offset provisions of the
poJicy are not matters of tort com-
pensation, but matters of coverage
govcrned by the contrâct ancl contract
law Hence, Ohio law barring stack-
ing and allowing the offsets is prop-
erþ applied. Howevet, this raised the
issue whether it is etror to apply
Ohio law which allows offsets and
precludes stacking which would vio-
late Montana public policy. Rccall
that the Montana court had refused
to enforce an Oregon choice-of-law
provision in YoøngbÌood in 1.993 and
held in Cavrotto u. Lnnbardi in 1994,
that a Connecticut choice-ofJaw
provision could not be an "effective
choice-of-law provision" within the
meaning of the Rcstatement (Second)
of Conflicts S 188(2), if it resulted in
violation of Montana public policy.
Â.ncl in Swanson n 2002, the court
refused to enforce a Colorado choice-
oflaw provision because it would
rcsult in grantìng the auto insurer
subrogation which was against public
policy in Montana. Finally, uncler
the Restatement, if Montanahas a
"material)y greater interest in the
determination of the issue" it can
override thc law of the stâte chosen
by the parties to govern their contract.
The court noted that Moodrohad
not appealed the District Court's
decision that Ohio law applied to the
auto poJicy but had instead simply
argued that the policy's laneuage
should not be enforced because it
violated Montana law, an argument
consistent with Yoøngblood, Casarotto,
and Swanson The court oprned that
its decision in Srvanson Q002) may
have confuscd thc situation and at-
tempted to clarify by reference to the
Restatement $ 1 87(2)þ):
Stated differently, we will not
apply the law of the state cho-
sen by the parties if three
factors are met: (1) if, but for
the choicc-ofJaw provision,
Montana law would apply un-
det $ 1BB of the Restatement;
(2) if Montana has a mateitaTly
greater interest in the particu-
lar ìssue than the state choòen
by the parties; and (3) if apply-
ing the state law chosen by thc
partìes would contravene â
fundamental policy of Montana.
NØith regard to fâctor (1), the
court turned to $ 188 which the court
said "governs situations where the
contracting'parties fail to select an
effective choice of law."
(1) The rights'and duties of
the parties with respect to an
issue in contract are deter-
mined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to
that issue, has the most sþnifì-
cant relationship to the tfans-
action and the parties under
the principles stated in $
6 fChoice-of-law Principles].
Recall that $ 6 refers the court to
the state's stâtutory directive which,
in Montana, is the previously quoted
MC,q. S 28-3-1.02 providing that the
"contlact is to be interpreted accord-
ing to the law and usage of the place
where it is to be pedotmed . . . ."
The court compâred the facts in
Mitchel/ with those of Moodro, the
Moodro facts being:
Policy promise to pày damages
"under the tort law of the state
where the motot vehicle acci-
deni occurred..."
Insured attending UM in
Montana
Insured working and living in
Montana
Insured paid taxes in Montana
Insured ìncutred, medical
expenses in Montana
Insured settled with. tortfeasor
giving risc to UIM claim in
Montana 
,
Judgment will,be rendeted and
paid in Montana
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Following Mitchell, the court
concluded that, as the place of per-
formance, Montana law would apply
but for the choice-ofJaw provision.
However, the court pointed out that
the poJicy in Mitchell contained no
choice-of-law provision while the
personal auto poJicy in Moodro dtd.
The court then turned attention
to the second inquiry, whether Mon-
tana had a "materialTy greater inter-
esC' than Ohio, the pre-condition to
the third inquiry of whether applyrng
Ohio law would violate Montana
public poticy.
NØhether Montana had a maten-
ally greatet interest required analysis
under Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws $ 1.87 and 188 (1971).
Restatement S 187(2) sets forth the
factors to considet and weigh:
(a) the place of contracting,
þ) th" place of negotiation of the
contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subjcct
mattef of the contract,
(e) the domicile, residence, nation-
ahq, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties.
Analyzing under those factors,
the court found as follows:
The policy was purchased
from an agency in Ohio, so
Ohio is place of contracting.
Moodro is an Ohio resident
and Nationwide is headquar-
tered in Ohio. The court
pointed out that the Restate-
ment comments say these con-
tacts "bear litde significance
when considered separately,
but gain importance based on
their relationship to the con-
tract issue involved and the
other contacts."
Location of the subject màtter
bears no significance because
there is no specific physical
thing or locahzed risk involved.
Any negotiations occurred in
Ohio. The Restatement ac-
cords weight to negotiations.
However, the court noted that
"insurance policies are not the
result of negotiating andbar
gaining by the parties," but are
adhesion contrâcts, so the
court accorded little weight to
the negotiation factor.
Montana, as previously dis-
cussed, was the place of per-
formance. The Restatement
gives this weight because such
a state "has an obvious interest
in the nature of performance
and in the party who is to per-
form" However the Restate-
ment wafns that place of
performance has little weight
when it was unknown at the
time of contracting. The court
noted that Montana did not
become the place of perfor-
mance until the accident oc-
curred and accorded it little
weight.
Considering those contacts and
the weight accorded each, the court
found that Montana did not have a
mateitally gre ter interest than Ohio
that would wøtrant applying Montana
law over Ohio's. Hence, Montana
public policy would not override
Ohio law.
There 
^ppe r to be two signifi-
cant errors in the reasoning here.
First, the assertion that the Montana
court would give little weight to place
of performance (À4ontana) because it
was unknown at the time of contract-
ing is arguably error. Place of perfor-
mânce was known at the time of
contracting, because the insurer
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agreed that, under the terdtoriality
provision, "the United States of
America, its territory and posses-
sions" including Puerto Rico or
Canada are the places it would per-
form. In essence, the insurer agreed
Montana (and every other state in the
union) would be the place of pedor-
mance. Furthetmore, Montana was a
place of performance even before the
accident occurrecl as were New York
and Florida. Moreover, where the
insurer has agreed to cover accidents
in all 50 states and the territories and
possessions of the United States,
what difference cloes it make which
statc's law applics?
Second, the rote application of
the Restatement S 187(2) princþles
takes no account of a state's strong
public policy prorlouncements, and
this decision was a major deviation
from Montana judsptudence. Moodro
suddenly removed any test that would
allow consideration of Montana's
strong public policy pronouncement
on validity of auto insurance policy
provisions. Under Moodro, for in-
stânce, there would be no way to
factor'tn Montanâ's abhortence of a
famtly or household exclusion that
would prerrent a chjld from: suing her
negligent parent for rendering her
paraplegic in an auto acciclent. Mon-
tana, in Tran¡america u. Ro/e (1983)
held such a provision to be void as
against public policy. ,{.s insurance
scholar, Professor l(en Abraham,
has said:
Automobile insutance cover-
age issues have so predomi-
n^nt 
^n 
impact on orclinary
individuals and account for so
large a portion of the personal
injury law suits brought in the
United States that the fìeld is
necessarily special. The result
is that consumer-protection
and victim-protection con-
cerns often opefate more
strongly in this area of
insurance than ottiers.
Accordingly, justìce Cotter vigor-
ously dissented to the maiority's de-
termination of " materially greàter
interest," and Justice Nelson con-
curred in that dissent. Justice Cotter
argued and pointed out substantial
authority for the position that "the
Restatement itself . . . posits the 'ma-
terially greàter interest' inquiry as
separate and apart From the S 1 88(2)
factors anaþsis. The majority, she
said, conflated the two anaþses al-
lowing the $ 188(2) anaþsis to consti-
tute the materially greatcr intcrest
determination. The court should
have detetmined "materiaþ greater
interesC' separate and apan from the
S 1BB(2) analysis which would give
Montana's important pubJic policy
protectìng UIM coverage much
greatef weight. Justice Cotter said
that the coutt has been conflating the
two tests in error thereby denying
Montana the materially greater inter-
est that should come from the pubJic
policy protections it has developed
around UIM coverage.
This most important dissent sets
out the bad flaw in thc court's rcccnt
and ongoing treaiment of out-of-state
auto policics. Thc court has now
adopted the Restatement and is apply-
ing the S 188(2) factors. But the fac-
tors, i.e., place of contracting, place
of negotiation, place of performance,
Iocation of subject of the contract,
and domicile or residence, do not
allow any consideration of the fact
that Montanahas a strong tradition
of pubJic policy protections that
apply to auto policy provisions.
Conflating the $ 188(2) factors to
consdrute "materially greate.r interest"
is error that explains the apparent
about-face that has caused the coutt,
to suddenly decide that Montana has
no materially greater interest in inter-
preting' out-of-state auto policies after
a long histoty of providing consum-
ers of such policies,the protections
o[ out well-developed public poticy.
Tenas a. Progressioe (2008):
Ignoring Montana's Materially
Greater Interest in its Public
Policy Protections Where There
is a Choice-of-Law Ptovision
In the case of Tenas u. Progressiue
Preferced Ins.38 in 2008, Justice Morris
followed the appJication of $ 188(2)
of Moodro to fìnd that Nevada's
interest outweighecl Montana's. Ironi-
cally, the court made special note of
the fact that the insureds were only
visiting Montana, a fact present in
virtually every previous case that had
gone the other way.
Baù>an Barnes had two Nevacla
auto insurance poJicies with Progres-
sive. She ancl her daughter were visit-
ing in Montana when the daughter
suffered injuries while a passenger in
an uninsured auto in Lake County,
Montana. She incurred $34,000 in
medical expenses. Ba*¡ara's policies
each had $25,000 UM limits and
contained anti-stacking clauses and
a choicc-of-law provision requìring
appJication of Nev¿da law to resolve
polìc¡t disputeq, progiessive eventu- l
' nlly p¿id a single limit o'f U-M and
refused the demand to stack the
second UM coverage.
Progressive filed an action in
Nevada to declare that the policy
prohibited stacking. A vreek later,
Tenas filed suit in State Districr
Court in Montana seeking a detetmi-
nation that the UM covcragc could bc
stacked. Progressive moved to dis-
miss the Montana action based on
comity and "priority jurisdiction."
Judge Christopher asscrted that thc
issue was choice-oflaw and not juris-
diction and denied Progressive's mo-
tion to dismiss. Christopher found
that applicarion of Nevada law would
, violate Montana public policy against
anti-stacking provisions ancl granted
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Tenas summary judgment and
attorney fees under Brewer Q003).
Progressive appealed.
On appeal, the court said, "The
District Court properþ subordinated
the clisctetionary principle of comity
to the important public poìicy ìmpli-
cations." A court need not honor
comity to relinquish jurisdiction
where the result will violate public
policy. Also, no Montana court has
adopted the general doctrine of
"priority jurisdiction." Agri-IVut
(1,997)3' was natrowly limited to the
federal law surrounding Indian tribal
jurisdiction.
Howevet, the court said the
District Court improperþ applied
Montana law to a Nevada policy
because, under conflicts of law
pdnciples, Nevada has a "materially
greater interest" in the matter than
Montana. The court cited CasaroÍto
(1994) as stating the most current
rulc where the contract contains a
choice of law provision. Under
Casarolto, the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws S 187(2) (1,971)
governs. That section provides:
(2) The law of the state chosen
by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties
will be applied, even if the
particular issue is one which
the patties could not have re-
solved by an explicit provision
in theit agreement directed to
that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to
the parties or the transaction
and there is no other reason-
able basis for the parties'
choice, or
þ) application of the law of
the chosen state would be
contfary to a fundamental
policy of â state which has a
materially gre ter interest
than the chosen state in the
determination of the par-
ticular issue and which, un-
det the rule of $ 188, would
be the state of the appli-
cable law in the absence of
an effective choice of law
by the parties.
No one asserted that (a) appJied.
The coutt must look next to $ 188
which refers to $ 6 of the Restate-
ment. Section 6, in return, provides
that"fa] court, subject to constitu-
tional testrictions, will follow a statu-
tory directive of its own state on
choice of lav¡." If there is no such
directive, $ 6(2) "provides seven
principles relevant to choice of
appJicable law, and S 1BB(2) provides
factors to aid in thât consideranon.
Applying Montana's starute, $ 28-
3-1.02, MCÁ., the court held that
Montana is the place of performance
because:
(1) The poJicy didn't limit
place of performance.
(2) The accident occurred in
Montana.
(3) The medical experìses were
incurred in Montana.
(4) Damages in Montana.
(5) Torteasor resided in
Montana.
(6) Initial claim payments
made in Montana.
However, the court then deter-
mined that Montana does not have
a"mateinlfy gte ter interest" than
Nevada, the chosen state under the
S 187(2) factors:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) th. place of negotiation
of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject
m^lter of the contract
(e) the domicile, residence,
nationalit¡ place of incotpora-
tion and place of business of
tle parties.
Consequently, the court said the
District Court improperþ gave sum-
mary judgment by applylng Montana
stacking law, and improperþ awarded
attorfley fees, since summary juclg-
ment for Tenas was improper.
Justices Cotter and Nelson in
their concurrences both referred to
theit previous dissents in Moodro to
the use of $ 1BB(2) factors to deter-
mine "materiøllv greater interest" but
did not, in fact, file dissents in Tenas.
Again, the sole use of the Restate-
ment factors from $ 187(2) to deter-
mine whethe r Montana had a
"mateitally gre tü interest" allowed
no consideration for Montana's con-
sumer protections in the auto insur-
ance policy provisions.
Justice Leaphart simply con-
curred in the decision. Justice Rice
concurred believing that the court
should have gnnted comity to Ne-
vada, andJustices Gray and l(/arner
joined in that concurrence.
Twcker e. Fd,rmers Ins. Exchange
(2009): Ignoring Montana Public
Policy in Policies Without Choice-
of-Law Provisions
Tucker u. Farmers Ins. Exchangea\ in
2009, involved an Idaho policy with
no choice-of-law ptovision. Justice
Morris summarily followed the
Moodro application of the 188(2)
factors to find that Montana had no
mateitdly greàter interest than Idaho.
In Tøc,ker, an l.l-year-old Idaho resi-
dent, Cady Tucker, was killed on
Montana Highway 83 at Seeley Lake
while riding þ a vehicle owned and
operated by Cushman, aMontanan.
Montana resident, Janie McNait neg-
ligently crossed the centedine causing
the collision. Cady Tucker died aftcr
Iiving an appreciable length of time.
Cady Tucker v/as an insured on
the Underinsured Motorist covetage
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on her Idaho stepfather's $1,000,000
umbrella policy with Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange (FIE). Issues clevel-
oped around potentìal offsets to the
UIM coverage and whether emotional
disttess of Tucker's mother consti-
tuted compensable "bodily injury''
under the FIE UIM coverage. Ulti-
mately, the case was tried agarnst FIE
in Missoula Montana whete a jury
awarded $516,000.
Ironically, on appeal in Tøcker,
it was the insurer that argued that
Montana law applied, and the
insured's personal representatives
who argued Idaho law applied. The
Montana Supreme Court said, in
Moodro a. Nationuide Mat. Fire Ins. Co.
(2008), it had adopted the "most
signi{ìcant relationship" approach
from Restatement (Second) Conflict
of Law. (Ihe FIE umbrella policy at
issue did not specifii choice of law)
The court noted, ". . .that the poJicies
had been issued in Idaho, to Idaho
residents, providing coverage to
Idaho vehicles." The court concedéd
that Montana was the place of per-
formance but indicated that "place
of performance bears little weight in
choice-of-law determinations, how-
ever, when the place of performance
is uncertain or unknown at the time
of conffacting" noting that Montana
drd not become the place of perfor-
mance until the accident. (Author's
note: this has been true in virtually all
of the prior decisions.) The court
asserted that "Montana's interest in
this dispute derives solely from its
stâtus as the place of performance"
which fact doesn't cre te 
^ 
materially
gre ter interest over Idaho. ,A.s the
couft said, 'qWe ate left to resolve a
clispute that centers on the interpreta-
tion of the Idaho insurance policies
issued to Idaho residents by corpora-
tions doing business in Idaho." This
time, Justices Cotter and Nelson
concutred making no mention of
their Moodro dissents. Justice I ,eaphan
concurred, and Justice 
'Warner wrote
a special concurrence explaining why
judicial estopþel wotid not apply to the
positìons the plaintiff took in Idaho
and Montana.
Twcker, then is a classic case of an
out-of-statê poJicy with no choice-of-
law provision appþing to an accident
and injuries in Montana. Considering
Ke nrp, Yoø ngb /o o d, S wan s o n, IYazz s /e1,
Kilmer, anà Mitchell, it is shocking to
see the court now finding no material
interest where Montana is the place
of performance and thete is no
choice-oflaw desþation in the
poJicy. The decision cannot be made
consistent with prior decisions and
the conflation.of the Restatement
S 187(2) factors with "materiaþ
gÍeàter interesC' is like a c r careen-
ing through the cases and sending
them sprawling. One might ask
whether there is ânything left of
Yoangblood.
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CONCLUSION
Reviewing the conflicts of law
cases in Montana in chronological
order, as we have here, reveals that
the Montana Supreme Court followed
a clear and predictable set of prin-
cþles in dealing with the issue of
what law applies to the out-of-state
auto policy involved in an accident in
Montana for almost thirty yeats from
I{erzq in 1979 until Moodro in 2008.
If the policy contained no choice-
oflaw provision, MCÄ S 28-3-1.02
controlled, and the court looked to
place of petformance as in the l{enuþ,
Mitchell, and Kilmer cases. Anaþsis of
the standard policies' basic insuring
âgreement, territoriality provision and
promise to pây judgments where
rendered determined place of perfor-
mance for the court. If the poJicy
contained a choice-of-law provision,
the court would enforce it as written
unless it would result in violation of
Montana's public policy as the court
determined rn Yoangblood, Casarotto,
and Swaruson.
The court 'n Casarolto adopted
SS 187 and 188 of the Restatement
and made thosc seclions consistent
with its prior clecision in Youngblood lry
finding that a choice-oflaw provision
that violates pubJic poJicy is not an
"effective choice of la#' under those
sections. Mitcltell too relied on the
Restatement, Kerzrp, and Yowrugblood.
Oberson, a work comp insurance case,
cited Yoanþlood and Swanson for their
refusal to enforce subrogation by
out-of-state insurets in violation of
Montana pubìic policy. The Montana
Federal District Court in Kilmer sam-
marily ruled that Mitchell anå Kerztp
dictated that Montana law could not
apply where a Montana policy was
involved in a North Dakota auto
accident, North Dakota being the
place of performance. As late as
2008, the court in IYamsle1 carefully
follov¡ed Restatement $ 6(1) in its
requirement that the court look to'
the relevant statute and applied MCA
S 28-3-102 and the MitcheÌÌ and Kemp
analyses to find that Montana law
appJied to a North Dakota poJicy in
an accident in Bozeman.
The dissent's criticism in ll/amsle1
of the extent to which the coutt was
finding Montana law to apply should
be taken with a grain of salt. Remem-
ber that every decision in which the
court applied Montana law ovet a
choice of law provision calling for
another statet law to apply involved
an 
^:uto 
insurance provision whose
application would cleaily violate
Montana's strong public poJicy. Each
of the cases has involved an insurer
attempting to enforce one of three
provisions the Montana Supreme
Court has repeatedly found repug-
nant as against pubJic interest: (1) a
provision allowing the insurer to
subrogate against the recovery of its
insurecl who has not been made
whole, a practce that this coutt has
simply not allowed; (2) placing in an
insurance policy a provision that
defeats coverage for which the in-
sured has paid valuable consideration;
or, (3) allowing the insurer to reduce
UM or UIM coverage by amounts
tecovered by the injured insured from
the tortfeasor's boclily injury coverage.
InexpJicably, in Moodro and Tenas
in 2008, the court became mired in
what it had previously described as
inflexible approaches of the Restate-
ment and to determine whether
Montana laad a "materially greater
interest" that would allow it to refuse
application of a provision that would
violate a fundamental public policy
of Montana. The court began rote
application of the S 187(2) factors as
the only âpparent factors in determin-
'tng 
" materially greater interest."
(a) the place of contracting,
þ) the place of negotiation
of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject
matter of the contract,
(e) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorpo-
ration and place of business
of the parties.
Those factors completely remove
from consideration Montana's mateit-
aþ greater interest by reason of its
strong pubJic policy protections for
consumefs of auto insurance, The
court does this by discounting place
of performance on the ground that it
is not k¡own at the time of contract-
ing and is only apparent after the
accident happened, dubious asset-
tions in light of the insurer's promise
to perform in all fìfty states. Further-
more, the coutt simply is not talking
about its strong public policies in
place fot protection of auto insur-
aflce consumefs.
Perhaps most stunning is the
court's application of this process in
Tacker in 2009, a case in which the
policy contained no choice-oflaw
provision. Application of the Restate-
ment there previously dictated look-
ing to our state's statutory directive,
MC,A. S 28-3-1.02, which would mean
âpplylng the place of petformance
standard. The coutt has never over-
tutned Kenþ, Mitchell, or Kilner.Vlhy
would it \>e analyzing "materially
gre ter interest" in a case where there
is no choice of law provision?
The Montana Supreme Court has
a tradition of protecring auto policy
insureds by cleaily identifying policy
provisions that are repugnant âs
against public policy. The end result
of the Moodro, Tenas, and Tøcker cases
in the last two years is a confused
abandonment of Montana's materiah
greàter interest in its public policy
pfotection. When an insurer promises
to perform in any one of fifty states,
it has no pa:ttcular interest in what
state's law applies. However, when an
accident causes people to be injured
or killed in Montana, this state has a
materially gneater interest in whether
policy provisions deemed void as
repugnant to public poticy deprive
the insureds of their coverage. This
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intetest needs to be inserted back into
the decisions and not "conflated"
into a reversal of thitty years of well-
reasoned precedent without exptessly
overruling that precedent. Until 2008,
Montana law has been quite clear in
the area of law applicable to out-of-
state poJicies. Ignoring the principles
established in such cases as Kertp,
Yoanþlood, Casarotto, and Mitchell
inffoduces an unpredictability in the
decisions. This is an opportunity for
counsel in the next case to claúfy for
the court the wisdom in the line of
cases from 1.979 to 2007 andper-
suade the court of the error of the
last two years of þoring Montana's
materially greater interest in its public
policy protections for consumers of
auto insurance.
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lnsurance lndustry Profits Through the Roof! The property/casualty insurance industry is systematically
overcharging consumers leading to record prof¡ts, according to the Consumer Federation of America (eFA)
lnsurer overcharges over the last four years amount to an average of $870 per household. Said J. Robert
Hunter, the Director of lnsurance for CFA:
A major reason why insurers have repor.ted record-high prof¡ts and low losses in recent years ¡s that
they have been methodically overcharging consumers, cutting back on coverage, underpaying claims,
and getting taxpayers to pick up some of the tab for risks the insurers should cover.
Source: J. Robert Hunter, Property/Casualty lnsurance ln 2008: Overpriced lnsurance and Underpaid Claims Result in Unjustified
Profits, Padded Reserues, and Excessive Capitalization, Consumer Federation of America, January 10, 2008; www.consumerted.org/pdfs/
2008lnsurance-White_Paper.pdÍ , From Center For Justice and Democracy - http://centerjd.org/archives/spotlight/
S OJ 
-P rof itsTh ro u ghT h e Ro of 0 8. pdf
"Representaliue gouernment and trial bljary are the heart and lungs of tiberfr.
lYithoat them we haue no otherfortfication against beingridden like borses,
fleeæd like sheep, worked like cattle, andfed and clothed like swine and hoands."
- John Adams
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